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ABSTRACT: 
 
In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of the relation between 
normativity and ethics. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophical method shapes his 
approach to metaphysics and the self and this, in turn, shapes his approach to ethics. The 
paper is divided into three parts. In Part 1, I examine Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
method in the Tractatus. In Part 2, I argue that exposure to the views of Schopenhauer, 
Russell and Mach shapes the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thinking on the self, leading him 
to reject restrictive (metaphysical) solipsism and to endorse a non-restrictive 
(philosophical) notion of the subject. In Part 3, I bring out the intimate connection that 
exists between Wittgenstein’s approaches to philosophical method, the self and ethics in 
the Tractatus. I argue that, for Wittgenstein, dissolving restrictive solipsism is ethically 
transforming: this dissolution retunes our dispositions to think and speak in a manner that 
reflects a greater clarity in our understanding of our place in the world – a clarity of 
understanding that is, in and of itself, ethically valuable.  
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Chon Tejedor, “Normativity and Ethics in the Tractatus: Method, Self and Value”  
 
In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of normativity and ethics. 
More specifically, I examine how his earlier approaches to philosophical method and to 
the self shape his approach to value, culminating in his claim to Ficker that the point of 
the Tractatus is “an ethical one.”1 One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to clarify the 
way in which the views of Schopenhauer, Russell and Mach contribute to Wittgenstein’s 
earlier treatment of the self and ethics. Schopenhauer, Russell and Mach are by no means 
the only thinkers to have exerted an important influence on Wittgenstein on this front; in 
                                                
1 I will be citing from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. 
David Pears and Brian F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1961). This letter is cited in 
Brian F. McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers (London: Routledge, 
2002), note 11, chap. 9. Some commentators have argued that Wittgenstein may have 
been merely trying to entice a reluctant publisher by presenting his book as having an 
ethical point. In my view, however, Wittgenstein’s insistence on the ethical dimension of 
the Tractatus needs to be taken seriously. On this, see Hans-Johann Glock, A 
Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 330; Cora Diamond, “Ethics, 
Imagination, and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in The New Wittgenstein, ed. 
Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 149-173; Michael 
Kremer, “The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense,” Noûs 35 (2001): 39-73; and Chon 
Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 138-155. 
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this respect, this paper only presents part of the complex intellectual background that 
contributes to the development of Wittgenstein’s position.2  
 Wittgenstein’s early approach to normativity and ethics is closely intertwined 
with his understanding of philosophical method. In this respect, we could go as far as 
saying that, in the Tractatus, all roads – that is, all discussions (e.g. those relating to 
thought, language, logical operations, necessity, science, the self, etc.) – lead to ethics. 
These different sections of the Tractatus, insofar as they exemplify the application of a 
philosophical method that aims at conceptual clarity, have a crucial ethical dimension for 
Wittgenstein. In this paper, I would like to explore one of these roads in particular: that 
which begins, in the Tractatus 5.6ff, with Wittgenstein’s application of his philosophical 
method to the problem of solipsism and the self and which culminates in an ethical 
transformation.3 
  Since Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics is intimately connected to the 
philosophical method at work in the Tractatus and to his discussion of the self, I have 
                                                
2 The notion of “influence” needs to be handled with care in this context. As we will see, 
the idea is not that Wittgenstein draws from these thinkers’ positions that he incorporates 
into his own; the idea is, rather, that by reflecting on their views (as he understood them) 
– that is, by entering into an internal dialogue with these authors – he is able to clarify 
and fine-tune his own approach to the philosophical problems that preoccupied him. 
3 For a discussion of (some of) the other roads to ethics found in the Tractatus, see 
Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein, 91-155 and Chon Tejedor, “The Earlier Wittgenstein on 
the Notion of Religious Attitude,” Philosophy 88 (2013): 55-71. 
	   4 
divided the paper into three sections: section 1 on the method of the Tractatus; section 2 
on the self; and section 3 on ethics. 
   
L1 The Method of the Tractatus 
As we know, the question of the philosophical method at work in the Tractatus 
has been one of the focus points of the New Wittgenstein debate. 4 In spite of their 
important differences, authors on different sides of this debate have tended to share two 
major related assumptions on this question. The first is that, for Wittgenstein, a 
proposition that is neither senseful nor senseless is therefore nonsensical.5 The second is 
                                                
4 There are, in fact, not one but a variety of philosophical methods at work in the 
Tractatus. On this, see notably Juliet Floyd, “Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible,” in 
Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, ed. Alice Cary 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 177-234. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss this point in any detail; I will therefore, for the sake of simplicity, speak of the 
method (in the singular) of the Tractatus in what follows. For a further discussion of this, 
see Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein, 156-168. 
5 Cf. James Conant, “Frege and Early Wittgenstein,” in Crary and Read, The New 
Wittgenstein, 189-195 and Peter M. S. Hacker, “Was he trying to whistle it?,” in Crary 
and Read, The New Wittgenstein, 353-355. Michael Kremer and Cora Diamond have both 
questioned this assumption. See Michael Kremer, “Mathematics and Meaning in the 
Tractatus,” Philosophical Investigations 25 (2002): 272-302, and Cora Diamond, 
“Wittgenstein, Anscombe and What Can Only be True” (Paper presented at the 
Wittgenstein Workshop, University of Chicago, 2013).  
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that Wittgenstein regards most – or at any rate a significant proportion – of the remarks 
that make up the Tractatus as nonsensical (either illuminatingly or plainly so). That the 
Tractatus should be made up of remarks that are nonsensical is indeed seen as central to 
the very task that the book is trying to achieve.6 
 In my view, both of these assumptions misrepresent Wittgenstein’s position and 
distort our understanding of the method at work in the Tractatus. Although it is not 
                                                
6 Marie McGinn, Dan Hutto, Michael Kremer, Peter Sullivan and Cora Diamond have 
also questioned this assumption to varying degrees. See Marie McGinn, “Between 
Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 99 (1999): 491-513; Daniel Hutto, Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy. 
Neither Theory nor Therapy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), esp. chap. 3; 
Kremer, “Mathematics and Meaning in the Tractatus”; Peter Sullivan, “On Trying to be 
Resolute: A Response to Kremer on the Tractatus,” European Journal of Philosophy 10 
(2002): 50-52; Marie McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein’s Early 
Philosophy of Logic and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Diamond, 
“What Can Only be True.”. In connection to this debate, it is worth noting that Conant 
does not suggest that Wittgenstein regards the propositions of the Tractatus as 
nonsensical in perpetuity, as if nonsensicality was a quality that remained permanently 
attached to certain signs. Nevertheless, it is, in Conant’s view, a crucial aspect of the 
method of the Tractatus that we should be able to view the propositions that make it up 
as nonsensical – James Conant, “Frege and Early Wittgenstein”. I am grateful to an 
anonymous referee for highlighting this point.  
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possible to provide a detailed defense of this claim here, I would like briefly to 
summarize some of the considerations that lead me to it.7  
 My reasons for rejecting the first assumption – namely that a proposition that is 
neither senseful nor senseless is automatically nonsensical – stem in part from 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the principles of the natural sciences in the Tractatus 6.3ff. 
In brief, Wittgenstein suggests that the principles of the natural sciences are neither 
senseful nor senseless propositions: they are instruction-propositions (akin to imperative 
commands) that are not truth-assessable.8 Wittgenstein does not view these propositions 
as nonsensical, however, because they serve a genuine purpose: the purpose of stipulating 
different optional, instrumentally valuable, natural science systems. Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the principles of the natural sciences shows clearly, in my view, that it is a 
mistake to assume that a proposition that is neither senseful nor senseless must be 
nonsensical for Wittgenstein. A proposition is a linguistic sign – a sentence – used for a 
particular purpose.9 In turn, a proposition is nonsensical when the sign that expresses it is 
                                                
7 For a more in depth discussion, see Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein.  
8 The view that scientific principles are not senseful, senseless or nonsensical can be 
traced back to James Griffin, Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1964), 102-108. Michael Kremer makes a similar point in connection to mathematical 
propositions in Kremer, “Mathematics and Meaning in the Tractatus.” It is also noted by 
Diamond in “What Can Only be True.” 
9 Although our views ultimately differ in their details, I am indebted to Michael Kremer 
and Luigi Perissinotto for the genesis of my thoughts on the relation between the notion 
of purpose and the method of the Tractatus. On this see notably Kremer, “Tractarian 
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used in a manner that defeats its apparent purpose.10 Nonsensical propositions are 
sentences used with an apparent purpose, where this apparent purpose subverts itself and 
ends up dissolving upon closer examination. In so far as they purport to serve a purpose, 
however, it can be helpful to call them ‘propositions’, as Wittgenstein does throughout 
the Tractatus.  
 Senseful propositions, senseless propositions and the instruction-propositions that 
express principles in the natural sciences all involve sentences used in purposeful 
manners – even though only the first serve the purpose of representing possible states.11 
                                                                                                                                            
Nonsense” and (in connection to On Certainty) Luigi Perissinotto, “To begin at the 
beginning,” in Doubt, Ethics and Religion: Wittgenstein and the Counter-Enlightenment, 
ed. Luigi Perissinotto and Vicente Sanfélix (Wien: Ontos Verlag, 2010), 151-178.  
10 Traditional philosophy is characterized by precisely this kind of nonsense for 
Wittgenstein. 
11 Wittgenstein’s employment of the word ‘use’ in the Tractatus is not univocal. He 
employs ‘benützen’ or ‘gebrauchen’ (translated as ‘to use’) in a variety of different ways 
and in very different contexts in the Tractatus, including in discussions of: the use of 
propositional signs to express senseful propositions (3.11 – ‘benützen’; 3.326 – 
‘gebrauchen’); the use of signs to signify meanings (3.322 – ‘gebrauchen’); the use of 
signs in senseless symbolic notation (3.3441 – ‘gebrauchen’; 5.461 – ‘die Benützung’); 
the use of variables (4.1273 – ‘gebrauchen’); the use of neither senseless nor nonsensical 
mathematical propositions  (6.211 – ‘benützen’); the use of signs to produce nonsensical 
propositions (5.5351 – ‘benützen’). For different treatments of ‘use’ in the Tractatus, see 
Roger White, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Reader's Guide (New 
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It is with this broader notion of purposeful use in mind, I suggest, that Wittgenstein notes, 
in the midst of his discussion of the principles of the natural sciences: “In philosophy the 
question, ‘What do we actually use [‘gebrauchen’] this word or this proposition for?’ 
repeatedly leads to valuable insights.”12 
For Wittgenstein, our ability to judge how and to what purposes signs are used is 
not dependent on our being presented with anything like a theory of language, thought or 
representation – and, indeed, the Tractatus does not aim to present anything like such a 
theory. On the contrary, in so far as we already have mastery of everyday language and 
thought, we already have the ability to make judgments of this type, even when we have 
no awareness of the deeper level, logical structure of language. 
 
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every 
sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning 
is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are 
produced.13 
 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Continuum, 2006), 61-62; Colin Johnston, “Symbols in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2007): 367-394; McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus, 
163-167; Cora Diamond, “Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein's Tractatus,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 55 (2005): 78-89; Conant, “Frege and Early Wittgenstein.” 
12 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.211. 
13 Ibid., 4.002. 
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In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in 
perfect logical order.—That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate 
here, is not an image of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. 
(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)14 
 
“Our problems are not abstract” in that they are not problems to be resolved by 
getting to grips with an abstract theory – for they do not stem from the lack of such a 
theory. Instead, our philosophical problems arise because, although we already possess 
the know-how necessary to use signs with a purpose and to recognize the purposeful use 
of signs (insofar as we already have mastery of everyday language and thought), our 
disposition to act on this know-how is eroded by our distorting philosophical practices.  
 
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not 
false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of 
this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the 
propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand 
the logic of our language. 
(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less 
identical than the beautiful.) 
And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.15 
 
                                                
14 Ibid., 5.5563. 
15 Ibid., 4.003. 
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Our “failure to understand the logic of our language” is a failure in our practical 
understanding, a failure to use signs in particular ways – not the kind of failure that might 
result from the lack of an abstract theory of language.16 It is our disposition to act – to use 
signs in particular ways – that needs to be corrected. And, for Wittgenstein, only an 
activity could help to correct such a floundering disposition to act. In his view, 
philosophy – properly understood – is precisely as such an activity: 
  
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.  
 
The purpose [‘Zweck’ in the original] of philosophy is the logical clarification of 
thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the 
clarification of propositions. 
                                                
16 It is this notion of practical understanding that is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s notion 
of showing in the Tractatus. I develop this idea further in Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein. 
On this see also Michael Kremer, “The Cardinal Problem of Philosophy,” in Crary, 
Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, 143-176; and Adrian W. Moore, The Evolution of 
Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 222-254.  
	   11 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to 
make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. 17 
 
The aim of this activity is to enable us to fine-tune our practical thinking and 
linguistic abilities, to orient our disposition to use signs away from the production of 
nonsense and towards the production of senseful propositions and thoughts. Ideally, this 
philosophical task would be performed in a face-to-face, interpersonal, dialectical 
manner, so that our individual dispositions to produce nonsense (the concrete dispositions 
each of us – as philosophers – has) could be worked on as soon as they broke surface:18  
 
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that 
has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to 
say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a 
meaning to certain signs in his propositions.19 
 
Since such a one-to-one, direct approach is not always possible, however, Wittgenstein 
produces a book – the Tractatus – that aims to achieve a similar result. The method of 
this book is intended to be similarly interactive: the aim is to engage the reader in an 
                                                
17 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.112. 
18 On this, see Floyd, “Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible,” and McGuinness, Approaches 
to Wittgentein, 264.  
19 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.53. 
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internal dialogue, similar to that which would take place in the more direct approach. Part 
of the idea is, of course, that it is only by personally engaging in such a dialectic struggle 
that the required transformation – the transformation in our disposition to use signs – can 
be achieved.  
 In order to effect this transformation in us, Wittgenstein presents us with a careful 
arrangement of sentences in the form of the Tractatus. But what status do these sentences 
have, in his view? Does he regard the bulk of them as nonsensical? This leads us to the 
second assumption mentioned earlier: the assumption that Wittgenstein regards most – or 
at any rate a significant proportion – of the remarks that make up the Tractatus to be 
nonsensical; in other words, the assumption that the Tractatus achieves its objectives 
precisely because it presents us with remarks that are, for the most part, (either 
illuminatingly or plainly) nonsensical.  
 I suggest that this misrepresents Wittgenstein’s position. In my view, Wittgenstein 
intends the Tractatus to present us with sentences (with signs) that can be used and 
understood in different ways. By arranging these sentences as he does, he is inviting us to 
engage with them in different ways – he is inviting us to try out different uses to which 
these sentences might be put. Wittgenstein’s method is varied and heterogeneous. He 
uses sentences in an intentionally ambiguous manner, as puzzles, with the deliberate 
purpose of encouraging us to exercise our everyday thinking and linguistic abilities 
against them.20 The process he invites us to follow often involves using one and the same 
                                                
20 There are some important affinities between my understanding of Wittgenstein’s use of 
puzzles and Cora Diamond’s discussion of riddles, even though our approaches 
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sentence, in turn, to express a senseful proposition, a senseless proposition and a piece of 
philosophical nonsense. This activity of using sentences in different ways and of coming 
to see clearly when a sentence is used in a manner that subverts its apparent purpose – i.e. 
nonsensically – is central to Wittgenstein’s method in the Tractatus. 
 Interestingly, both Paul Engelmann and Frank Ramsey, who were amongst the 
first to read the Tractatus and to discuss it with Wittgenstein, mention that he deliberately 
includes ambiguous sentences in his book, as part of his philosophical method. In his 
Memoir, Engelmann makes the following remark concerning Wittgenstein’s use of 
brackets in “(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)” in Tractatus 6.421:  
 
But the statement [in Tractatus 6.421] is put in parentheses, said by the way, as 
something not really meant to be uttered, yet something that should not be passed 
over in silence at that point. And this is done as a form of a reminder recalling to 
the understanding reader an insight which he is assumed to possess in any case.21  
 
Similarly, in a letter to his mother dated 20th September 1923, Ramsey writes:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
ultimately differ in their details – Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, 
Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 267-290. 
21 Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir, trans. L. 
Furtmüller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), 124, also quoted in Joachim Schulte, “Ethics and 
Aesthetics in Wittgenstein” (Paper presented at the “Wittgenstein on the Literary, the 
Ethical and the Unsayable” workshop. Chicago, IL, 2011): 3. 
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His [Wittgenstein’s] idea of his book is not that anyone by reading it will 
understand his ideas, but that some day someone will think them out again for 
himself, and will derive great pleasure from finding in this book their exact 
expressions. […] Some of [Wittgenstein’s] sentences are intentionally ambiguous 
having an ordinary meaning and a more difficult meaning which he also 
believes.22  
 
In the light of this, the following remarks by Paul Engelmann strike a particularly strong 
chord:  
 
Yet we do not understand Wittgenstein unless we realize that it was philosophy 
that mattered to him and not logic, which merely happened to be the only suitable 
tool for elaborating his world picture. 
 This the Tractatus accomplishes in sovereign fashion, ending up with 
implacable consistency by nullifying the result, so that the communication of its 
                                                
22 This remark is also quoted in Brian F. McGuinness, Wittgenstein in Cambridge 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 139 (no. 99), and in Schulte, “Ethics and Aesthetics in 
Wittgenstein,” 13. It is unclear what Ramsey means by “meaning” and “believes” here. 
Since the letter in question is addressed to his mother (rather than to a philosopher 
acquainted with the Tractatus), we need not understand Ramsey to be using ‘belief’ to 
capture the mental representation of content. His intention may simply have been to 
indicate that the more difficult lesson to be drawn from such sentences is also one that 
Wittgenstein found purposeful or one he subscribed or was committed to.  
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basic thoughts, or rather of its basic tendency — which, according to its own 
findings, cannot on principle be effected by direct methods — is yet achieved 
indirectly. He nullifies his own world picture, together with the 'houses of cards' 
of philosophy (which at that time at least he thought he had made collapse), so as 
to show 'how little is achieved when these problems are solved'.23 
 
Wittgenstein uses the sentences of the Tractatus for a particular purpose. This 
purpose is the clarification of propositions and thoughts – that is: the re-orientation of our 
disposition to use linguistic and mental signs away from nonsense. The propositions of 
the Tractatus have a purpose to serve as long as we continue to be drawn towards 
metaphysics and towards a confused approach to logic, representation and ethics. Once 
we overcome these, however, the propositions of the Tractatus no longer have a function 
to serve: they become redundant, that is, purposeless. I suggest that it is at this point that 
they become nonsensical.24 Hence, the point at which the Tractatus fully achieves its own 
                                                
23 Engelmann, Letters and Memoir, 102. 
24 In the more direct, face-to-face method, this would be the point at which the 
interlocutor would simply end the discussion – that is, opt for silence. We should avoid 
persevering in attending to or in repeating these sentences beyond this point, in that doing 
so might lure us back into the misguided attractions of substantive metaphysics. In this 
respect, persevering with these sentences once they have served their purpose would be 
self-subverting. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising a question that led to 
this clarification.  
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purpose of clarification is precisely the point at which it becomes redundant: it is the 
point at which we come to recognize that it is time to let go of the sentences of the book, 
just as we might let go of a ladder once we have used it for the purpose of climbing to the 
top. It is with this in mind, in my view, that we should approach Tractatus 6.54: 
 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me, eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
 He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world 
aright.25 
 
The message from this entry is not that Wittgenstein regards the bulk of the 
propositions in the Tractatus as nonsensical and that their being so is central to the 
Tractatus’ task and method. The idea is that the process of clarification in which the 
Tractatus engages us culminates in our coming to recognize that there is no longer any 
purpose to be served by the propositions in the book: it involves coming to recognize 
that, at the end of the process, in the end (‘am Ende’ in the German), they become 
nonsensical precisely because the process in question has been successful. As we will see 
in section 3, Wittgenstein’s understanding of the philosophical method at work in the 
Tractatus is intimately connected to his understanding of the ethical dimension of his 
                                                
25 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.54. 
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book. Before we are in a position to turn to this issue, however, we need to consider the 
question of Wittgenstein’s earlier approach to the self. 
 
L1 Wittgenstein’s Earlier Approach to the Self 
There is no doubt that Wittgenstein’s earlier approach to ethics develops and 
changes during the period of the composition of the Notebooks.26 Much of the evolution 
in his understanding of ethics during this period is tied to changes in his approach to the 
notion of the self or subject and therefore to his discussion of solipsism. I suggest that the 
approach to ethics that finally crystallizes in the Tractatus results in part from the 
rejection of two particular notions of the self or subject: the Schopenhauerian notion of 
‘willing subject’ understood as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation; 
and the Russellian notion of “thinking subject” understood as an object-like subject of 
thought. In the next two sections, I will briefly defend my claim that Wittgenstein rejects 
both of these notions of the subject in the Tractatus. This will enable us to see how his 
discussion of the self in the Tractatus 5.6ff eventually leads him to ethics. 27 
 
L2 The Willing Subject 
                                                
26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. Georg H. von Wright and Gertrude E. 
M. Anscombe, trans. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961). 
27 There are important points of convergence between my approach in this section and 
Juliet Floyd’s in Juliet Floyd, “The Uncaptive Eye: Solipsism in the Tractatus,” in 
Loneliness, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Religion, 1998), 79-108. 
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According to one prevalent interpretation of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein rejects 
the notion of thinking subject only to endorse the Schopenhauerian notion of a willing 
subject understood as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. In other 
words, in this reading, the notion of thinking subject is only of secondary interest to 
Wittgenstein – his real interest lies with the notion of willing subject, which, in the 
Tractatus, he calls “metaphysical subject.” This notion of the subject is seen as at the 
heart of Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics: ethical value, in this view, is made possible by 
virtue of this subject. I call this the Schopenhauerian reading.  
 According to the Schopenhauerian reading, both ethics and representation are 
made possible by virtue of the actions of the transcendental willing subject. 28 
Wittgenstein certainly appears to endorse such a view at several junctures in the 
Notebooks.29 The question before us is whether he continues to endorse this view in the 
                                                
28 See, for instance: Michael Morris, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein 
and the Tractatus (London: Routledge, 2008), 320-328 (note 4), and Martin Stokhof, 
World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought (Palo Alto: 
Standford University Press, 2002), 202-203 (note 4). Peter Hacker places the emphasis on 
the view that the willing subject is the condition of representation – Peter Hacker, Insight 
and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 73-80. 
29 For example, Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 5.8.16.  
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Tractatus. I suggest that he does not – a conclusion I have defended in detail elsewhere.30 
Here, I will limit myself to summarising some of the main arguments for this conclusion.  
 Although the expression “willing subject” is absent from the Tractatus, it is often 
suggested that this notion survives into the Tractatus under a different label: that of 
“metaphysical subject.” After all, Wittgenstein does use the expression “metaphysical 
subject” and, indeed, appears actively to endorse it, notably in Tractatus 5.641:  
 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-
psychological way. 
   What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. 
   The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the 
human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the 
limit of the world – not a part of it.31 
 
There are serious problems with the suggestion that the “metaphysical subject” of 
Tractatus 5.641 is the “willing subject” of the Notebooks, however. For there is simply 
                                                
30 See Chon Tejedor, “El solipsismo en el Tractatus,” in Sentido y sinsentido: 
Wittgenstein y la crítica del lenguaje, ed. Carlos Moya (Valencia: Pre-Textos, 2008), 
189-206; Chon Tejedor, “The Ethical Dimension of the Tractatus: Wittgensein and the 
Counter-Enlightenment,” in Doubt, Ethics and Religion, ed. Luigi Perissinotto and 
Vicente Sanfélix (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010), 85-103; Tejedor, “Wittgenstein on the 
Notion of Religious Attitude”; Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein, 46-90. 
31 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.641. 
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no evidence, in the Notebooks, to indicate that the expressions “willing subject” 
 and “metaphysical subject” are regarded by Wittgenstein as interchangeable. Both 
expressions appear in the Notebooks, but – crucially – they are never used alongside each 
other in the same entries.32 And there is nothing in those entries that do discuss them to 
suggest that these expressions are in any way equivalent to each other for Wittgenstein.  
 There is, furthermore, persuasive evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein had come 
to reject the notion of willing subject prior to writing the Tractatus. Note indeed that, 
having endorsed the notion of willing subject in entries such as Notebooks 5.8.16, the 
Notebooks discussion comes to a rather abrupt end in November of 1916, with two 
entries that show Wittgenstein as having second thoughts about this very notion: 
Notebooks 9.11.16 and 19.11.16. Notebooks 9.11.16 indicates that experience does not 
require the willing subject to be possible. Since experience is a type of thought, of mental 
representation at this stage for Wittgenstein, Notebooks 9.11.16 therefore advances that 
mental representation does not require the willing subject. In the next entry (i.e. 
Notebooks 19.11.16), Wittgenstein considers an even stronger suggestion: that there is in 
fact no reason whatsoever to posit a willing subject. I propose that Wittgenstein does 
indeed abandon this notion of willing subject in its entirety in or shortly after November 
1916 – and certainly before he starts working on the final version of the Tractatus. the 
notion of a transcendental subject understood as a condition of representation or as a 
condition of ethics.  
                                                
32 Indeed, the expression “metaphysical subject” is only used in two entries of the 
Notebooks: in 4.8.16 and 2.9.16. 
	   21 
 That Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics undergoes a significant change precisely 
around this time is corroborated by his correspondence with Paul Engelmann. 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the willing subject develop most rapidly during the weeks he 
spends with Engelmann, whom he first meets in Olmütz in October 1916.33 We know that 
many of the conversations between Wittgenstein and Engelmann during this period focus 
on Schopenhauer’s approach to ethics, an approach that posits a transcendental notion of 
the subject very much like that of the “willing subject” from the Notebooks.34 The 
strongly Schopenhauerian remarks from the Notebooks end abruptly in late November 
1916, with the two entries I mentioned above (Notebooks 9.11.16 and 19.11.16). Shortly 
thereafter, Wittgenstein leaves Olmütz to travel to Vienna and then returns to the front. 
When Engelmann and Wittgenstein meet again in December 1917, Engelmann notes that 
Wittgenstein’s views and attitude have changed. It is thus that, in January 1918, 
Engelmann writes a letter in which he expresses his concern over Wittgenstein’s altered 
spiritual and ethical state. Referring to their recent meeting, in December 1917, 
Engelmann writes: “It seemed to me as if you – in contrast to the time you spent in 
Olmütz, where I had not thought so – had no faith.” 
 
To this, Wittgenstein replies: 
                                                
33 See Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 12.10.16; 15.10.16; 17.10.16; 20.10.16; 4.11.16; 9.11.16; 
and 19.11.16. 
34 That Wittgenstein and Engelmann repeatedly discuss Schopenhauer’s views during 
their stay in Olmütz is established in Brian F. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young 
Ludwig 1889-1921 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 252-253. 
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If you tell me I have no faith, you are perfectly right, only I did not have it before 
either. […] I am clear about one thing: I am far too bad to be able to theorize 
about myself; in fact, I shall either remain a swine or else I shall improve, and 
that’s that! Only let’s cut out the transcendental twaddle when the whole thing is 
as plain as a sock on the jaw.35 
 
Wittgenstein’s reply to Engelmann betrays an important change in Wittgenstein’s 
attitude to (and tolerance of) the transcendental approach to ethics that had been the focus 
of so many of his conversations with Engelmann in Olmütz, in the autumn of 1916. A 
likely explanation for this change would be that, having explored the Schopenhauerian, 
transcendental approach in depth in his conversations with Engelmann, Wittgenstein has, 
during the time they have spent apart, concluded that this approach is to be discarded: the 
notion of transcendental willing subject has fallen apart in his hands.36 I propose that, by 
the winter of 1917 – 1918, when Wittgenstein is writing the remarks that come to form 
the Prototractatus, he has already abandoned the Schopenhauerian notion of 
                                                
35 See Paul Engelmann, Wittgenstein: Letters, Lectures, Conversations, Memoirs 
(Oxford: Intelex Past-Masters, Oxford University, 2013), 10. These letters are cited in 
Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 
152-153. My italics in the last instance. 
36 We owe this expression to Warren Goldfarb – Warren Goldfarb, “Metaphysics as 
Nonsense: On Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit,” Journal of Philosophical Research 
22 (1997): 71. 
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transcendental willing subject as condition of representation and ethics.37 This would 
indeed explain why there is no mention of the willing subject in the Prototractatus, the 
Tractatus or indeed the Notebooks, after the 19th of November 1916.  
 
L2 The Thinking Subject38 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the “thinking subject,” unlike that of the “willing 
subject,” survives into the composition of the Prototractatus and the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein characterizes the “thinking subject” as a simple, object-like subject that 
entertains thoughts. In other words: the thinking subject is a simple, object-like subject of 
thought. According to Wittgenstein, this notion of subject is also fundamentally flawed.39 
                                                
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Prototractatus, ed. Brian F McGuinness, Tauno Nyberg, Georg 
H von Wright, trans. Brian F McGuinness and David Pears (London: Routledge, 1971). 
38 For an earlier version of my discussion of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the thinking 
subject and the visual field, see Tejedor, “El solipsismo.” On this, see also Luciano 
Bazzocchi, “A Significant ‘False Perception’ of Wittgenstein's Draft on Mind’s Eye,” 
Acta Analytica 29 (2014): 255-266. 
39 See also Hans Sluga, “Whose House is that? Wittgenstein on the Self,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga and David G. Stern (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 320-353. For a different strand in Wittgenstein’s 
critique of the notion of thinking subject, see James Levine, “Logic and Solipsism,” in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: History and Interpretation, ed. Michael Potter and Peter 
Sullivan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 170-238. 
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Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with the notion of thinking subject emerges as early as 
August 1916 in the Notebooks, in the following entries:40 
 
The I is not an object.41  
 
I objectively confront every object. But not the I.42  
 
The I makes its appearance in philosophy through the world’s being my world.  
The visual field has not, e.g., a form like this: 
 
43 
 
These concerns survive into the composition of the Tractatus, where they emerge in the 
following entries: 
 
  There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.  
                                                
40 In what follows, I am using my renderings of the original figures of the visual field 
drawn by Wittgenstein. 
41 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 7.8.16. 
42 Ibid., 11.8.16. 
43 Ibid., 12.8.16. 
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   If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a 
report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my 
will, and which were not etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or 
rather, of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could 
not be mentioned in that book.44  
 
The subject does not belong to the world.45  
 
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? 
   You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But 
really you do not see the eye.  
   And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.46  
 
For the form of the visual field is surely not like this: 
 
47 
 
                                                
44 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.631. 
45 Ibid., 5.632. 
46 Ibid., 5.633. 
47 Ibid., 5.6331. 
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The Prototractatus version of this discussion is similar to that of the Tractatus, except for 
a (significant, as we will see below) difference in the drawings of the visual field used in 
the Tractatus and Prototractatus versions of the argument. The latter reads:  
 
For the form of the visual field is surely not like this: 
48 
 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the visual field in Tractatus 5.633, 5.6331, 
Prototractatus 5.33543, 5.335431 and Notebooks 12.8.16 is central to his rejection of the 
notion of thinking subject. The eye in these entries is intended to capture the notion of 
self; the visual field, the field of all possible thought.49 That the metaphor of the visual 
field is used (at least in part) to reflect on what can possibly be represented in thought or 
language is corroborated by the way in which, in Notebooks 12.8.16, “the visual field has 
not, e.g., a form like this [...]” is immediately followed by a point concerning “all that we 
can describe at all.”50 
                                                
48 Wittgenstein, Prototractatus, 5.335431. 
49 The Tractatus 5.6ff place great emphasis on the notion of possible thought; indeed, 
“my world” in Tractatus 5.6, 5.62 and 5.641 stands for the world as it can possibly be 
given to me in thought. 
50 My italics. 
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 The Notebooks discussion of the thinking subject makes it clear that 
Wittgenstein’s point is not merely that the subject cannot be found in the field of possible 
thought.51 The point is, rather, that the subject is not an object and, for this reason, it is 
not a possible object of thought. That this is Wittgenstein’s central concern is also shown 
in his choice of drawings for the visual field (see above), which do not uniformly place 
the eye inside the visual field, as one would expect them to do if Wittgenstein’s central 
point concerned the location of the subject relative to the field of possible thought.52
 The driving force behind Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the thinking subject is not 
a possible object of thought is not, therefore, that the thinking subject fails to show up in 
any empirical or introspective review of the contents of one’s mind. Instead, the thinking 
subject is not a possible object of thought in that the notion of thinking subject is 
fundamentally inconsistent: the thinking subject is, in effect, the notion of an object-like 
non-object-like self. To put it more precisely: Wittgenstein uses the phrase “thinking 
subject” to highlight one particular  – inconsistent and therefore purposeless – way in 
which the term self is used in philosophical arguments. Consider, for instance, the 
following: 
 
                                                
51 Cf. David Pears, The False Prison, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 153–190. 
52 For an earlier version of my discussion of Wittgenstein’s early treatment of the 
thinking subject, see Tejedor, “El solipsismo.” See also Bazzocchi, “Draft on Mind's Eye.” 
Several authors, including notably Pears, argue that the main point of the visual field 
analogy is that the eye cannot be found within this field. Pears, The False Prison, 153–
190.  
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(R) 
(a) There is only knowledge by acquaintance 
(b) Other selves cannot possibly be given in acquaintance 
(c) I am acquainted with my self as well as with other objects 
 
Conclusion: 
I can only have knowledge of my self and of the other objects given to me in 
acquaintance. I can have no knowledge of other selves. 
 
Bertrand Russell tries to counter a version of this argument in his discussions of privacy, 
acquaintance, knowledge and the self between 1905 and 1919, in works such as “On 
Denoting,” “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Problems of 
Philosophy, and his manuscript for Theory of Knowledge. For Wittgenstein, however, 
Russell’s attempts to counter this argument are weakened by his failure to realize that the 
term “self” is used in an inconsistent manner in arguments such as (R): (b) uses “self” to 
capture a subject – that is, a non object; (c) in turn uses “self” to capture a possible object 
of acquaintance.  
 
L2 Mach’s Influence and the notion of Metaphysical Subject 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the notions of willing and thinking subject has 
important ethical implications, as we will see in section 3. Before we turn to those, 
however, we need to consider his notion of “metaphysical subject.” The notion of 
metaphysical subject is clearly of great importance to Wittgenstein. He discusses it on 
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repeated occasions, in the Notebooks, the Prototractatus, and the Tractatus. I propose 
that, for Wittgenstein, any investigation into the notion of metaphysical subject is really 
an investigation into the question: is there a viable notion of the self that is distinctively 
philosophical?53 In his search for a satisfactory, distinctively philosophical notion of the 
self, Wittgenstein considers three candidates: the notion of willing subject, that of 
thinking subject and that of metaphysical subject. The former two emerge as part of 
philosophical attempts to impose metaphysical, solipsistic restrictions on the world. 
Having discarded both of these notions of the self as restrictive condition, Wittgenstein 
moves on to endorse a different philosophical understanding of the self: the 
“metaphysical subject” of Tractatus 5.641.  
 In Tractatus 5.641, Wittgenstein writes that the metaphysical subject is “the limit 
of the world – not a part of it.” I suggest that the term “limit” does not aim to capture the 
notion of condition here.54 When Wittgenstein indicates that the metaphysical subject is 
the limit of the world, he is not suggesting that some (object-like or non-object-like) 
                                                
53 It is because Wittgenstein has this question in mind that he equates “philosophical self” 
with “metaphysical subject” in Tractatus 5.641.  
54 The idea that the notion of limit need not be understood in a restrictive manner emerges 
in the works of McGinn, Moore and Sullivan, although their understandings of this 
notion differ from each other (and indeed from mine). See McGinn, “Between 
Metaphysics and Nonsense”; Adrian W. Moore, “Ineffability and Nonsense – Part I,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77 (2003): 169-193; 
Peter M. Sullivan, “Ineffability and Nonsense – Part II,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume 77 (2003): 195-223. 
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subject is a necessary condition of the world, representation or indeed ethics. Instead, 
Wittgenstein is here using the term “limit” to capture the notion of totality.55 The 
metaphysical subject is the limit of the world in that it encompasses all possible thought. 
For Wittgenstein, the phrase “metaphysical subject” aims to capture, quite simply, the 
totality of possible thoughts.56 It is this philosophical notion of the self that Wittgenstein 
endorses at the end of the solipsism discussion: the self understood quite simply as the 
totality of possible thoughts. This notion of the “metaphysical subject” is, I suggest, an 
adaptation of a notion of the self that Wittgenstein finds in the works of Ernst Mach. Let 
us therefore briefly consider the Machian approach to the self. 
 In Knowledge and Error, Mach engages in a discussion of the self that focuses on 
the distinction between the notions of object and subject. This discussion concludes with 
                                                
55 This understanding of limit as totality also emerges elsewhere in the Tractatus, notably 
in 4.51, where Wittgenstein writes: “Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: 
then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all 
propositions, and that fixes their limits.” I am grateful to John Preston for a discussion of 
this issue. 
56 There are serious problems with Wittgenstein’s understanding of totality in the 
Tractatus, as has been discussed in detail in Peter M. Sullivan, “The Totality of Facts,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 175-192. However, I am not 
convinced that Wittgenstein is fully aware of these difficulties when he writes the 
Tractatus. For Wittgenstein’s treatment of the notion of totality, see Frank P. Ramsey, 
“Critical Notice of L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus,” Mind 32 (1923): 478. 
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the rejection of the notion of the self understood as an object-like subject and with 
Mach’s endorsement of a different notion of the self: “my ego in the widest sense.” 
 
If I now call the sum of my mental aspect, sensations included, my ego in the 
widest sense (in contrast with the restricted ego) then in this sense I could say that 
my ego contains the world (as sensation and idea).57 
 
This notion of the self (“my ego in the widest sense”) is intimately connected for 
Mach with the idea that my mental life (i.e. the contents of my mind) coincides with the 
world. Instead of working with the notion of the subject as condition of the world (the 
notion of a subject that imposes metaphysical restrictions on the world), Mach places the 
emphasis on the idea that the contents of one’s mind and the contents of the world are 
perfect reflections of each other – that they are, in some important respect, identical to 
each other, or in perfect harmony with each other. This idea comes into focus when one 
pulls away from the notion of the subject as condition of representation and concentrates 
instead on the contents of representation themselves. 
 Wittgenstein’s discussion of the thinking subject – which culminates in his 
rejection of this notion and in his endorsement of the notion of metaphysical subject – is 
greatly influenced by his exposure to Mach’s work. Indeed, Wittgenstein seems to have 
drawn the phrase “a point without extension” from Mach, who uses it in The Analysis of 
                                                
57 Ernst Mach, Knowledge and Error—Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry, trans. 
Thomas J. McCormack and Paul. Foulkes (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 6f.  Cited in 
McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein, 131. 
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Sensations (1886).58 It also seems likely that Wittgenstein drew inspiration for his 
drawings of the visual field from Mach’s own drawing of the contents of his visual field, 
found in the same work:59 
 
60 
 
                                                
58 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.64. Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation 
of the Physical to the Psychical, trans. C. M. Williams (Chicago: Open Court, 1914), 12. 
59 Sabine Paul also draws a parallel between Mach’s drawing and Wittgenstein’s 
drawings of the visual field – see Sabine Paul, “Le moi peut-il être sauvé?,” 
Philonsorbonne 1 (2006-2007): 93. 
60 Mach, Analysis of Sensations, 19, Fig. I. 
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We know that Wittgenstein was acquainted with Mach’s work. 61 We also know that he 
was exposed to Mach’s views on the self indirectly, though Weininger’s writings, which 
he read (or perhaps re-read), in the middle of the First World War.62   
 I suggest that, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein ends up endorsing a modified 
version of the Machian notion of self. Wittgenstein’s version is modified in that his 
notion of the self is broader than Mach’s: the notion endorsed by Wittgenstein is that of 
the “metaphysical subject” understood as the totality of possible thoughts. Where Mach is 
working with the idea of the mental life (the thoughts) of a particular human being, 
Wittgenstein is working with the broader notion of all possible thoughts: all possible 
representations in the medium of thought. For Wittgenstein, this notion of the self (the 
totality of possible thoughts) is not associated with the metaphysically restrictive notion 
of the subject as condition of representation and of the world. The “metaphysical subject” 
that Wittgenstein ends up endorsing in Tractatus 5.641 is metaphysically non-restrictive. 
By the end of the discussion of solipsism, Wittgenstein is thus encouraging us to 
acknowledge that the only viable, philosophically interesting notion of the self, is that of 
the totality of possible thoughts – where this notion is understood in a non-restrictive 
                                                
61 For a discussion of the influence of Mach’s writings on Wittgenstein, see notably Allan 
Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1973), 92-166 and 202-238. 
62 Indeed, this explains the timing of the Notebooks remarks on solipsism, which start to 
appear in 1915. See McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein, 134.  
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manner, as imposing no conditions on the world.63 As we will see in the next section, 
coming to reject the notion of the subject as condition of the world has important ethical 
implications for Wittgenstein.  
  
L1 The Ethics of the Tractatus 
According to the Schopenhauerian reading, the Tractatus succeeds in fulfilling its 
ethical purpose in that it contains ethical propositions (e.g. the Tractatus 6.4ff), which, 
though nonsensical, succeed in expressing ineffable ethical insights. In so doing, the 
Tractatus helps us to adopt what is, in this reading, Wittgenstein’s understanding of the 
ethical attitude: the attitude of choosing to abandon or let go of desire, that is, the attitude 
of acceptance of reality. Elsewhere, I have argued that this fundamentally misrepresents 
Wittgenstein’s position.64 For Wittgenstein, the ethical attitude is not an emotive attitude 
of acceptance. Nor is the ethical attitude something that can be chosen (let alone freely 
chosen). Instead, the ethical attitude is dispositional: it is the disposition to use signs in 
ways that reflect the clarity in one’s command of language and thought. Having an 
                                                
63 I develop this idea further in Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein, 46-90 and 119-137. In 
connection to this, it is worth noting that, although TLP 5.5561 mentions “reality”, there 
is strong evidence to suggest that the remarks on solipsism in the TLP 5.6ff in particular 
are primarily concerned, not with the world understood as reality or the totality of facts 
(cf. TLP 1), but with the world as the totality of possibilities. I defend this view in in 
Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein, chap. 2. 
64 Tejedor, “Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude”; Tejedor, The Early 
Wittgenstein, 138-155. 
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ethical attitude is having certain practical abilities honed, it is being disposed to use signs 
in certain ways and not in others. In particular, the ethical attitude involves being 
disposed to resist using signs in confused, purposeless ways that result in philosophical 
nonsense. In section 2, we discussed two such cases of nonsense: the Schopenhauerian 
use of the expression “willing subject” to capture a transcendental restrictive condition of 
the world; and the use of expressions such as “thinking subject” in solipsistic positions 
such as those discussed by Russell. One of the consequences of rejecting these notions of 
the subject as condition of the world – that is, one of the consequences of rejecting 
restrictive solipsism – is that doing so transforms our understanding of the place we 
occupy in the world. By abandoning restrictive solipsism – that is, by abandoning the 
idea that the self occupies a privileged position and is capable of imposing restrictive, 
metaphysical conditions on the world – we come better to understand ourselves: we come 
to understand that there is nothing special to our relation to reality, that we do not stand in 
a privileged position in the world, but that we are on a par with all other elements of 
reality. If the I, as subject, were a condition of the world, I would occupy a privileged, 
fundamental position within it: the world would be fundamentally dependent on I; I 
would be of far greater importance than anything else in the world since, without me, 
there would be no world. When the philosophical temptation to treat the I as condition of 
the world is removed, the temptation to see myself as fundamentally more important than 
other aspects of the world disappears. From the point of view of what is essential or 
fundamental (as opposed to, say, psychological – i.e. for Wittgenstein, accidental) we, 
human beings, are equal in importance and status to all other creatures and facts in the 
	   36 
world. This idea emerges in the Notebooks (where it is linked to a remark concerning the 
subject as boundary of the world which is clearly the precursor of Tractatus 5.641):  
 
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body or the human 
soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary 
(not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is a 
part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc., etc. 
   Whoever realises this will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own 
body or for the human body. 
   He will regard humans and beasts quite naïvely as objects which are similar and 
which belong together.65 
 
For Wittgenstein, acknowledging that we are equal in status to all other elements 
of the world changes our understanding of ourselves and of our position in the world. 
Since this understanding is ethically valuable, acquiring it makes us ethically better.66 By 
exposing as nonsensical the notion of the subject as condition of the world, Wittgenstein 
thus aims to dissolve a fundamentally confused understanding of our own status in the 
world. For him, the increased clarity that results from this process is, in and of itself, 
ethically transforming: by overcoming a self-deceptive, confused understanding of our 
own importance and position in the world, we are rendered ethically better.  
                                                
65 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 2.9.16. Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.641. 
66 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for a series of comments that led to the 
clarification of this point.  
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 If the Tractatus succeeds in fulfilling its ethical purpose, it is not because it 
contains illuminatingly nonsensical propositions capable of expressing ineffable ethical 
insights (e.g. the Tractatus 6.4ff), but because the process of clarification in which the 
book as a whole engages us is – in and of itself – ethically transforming. In particular, by 
abandoning restrictive solipsism and gaining a clearer understanding of ourselves and of 
our position in the world, we become ethically better.67 In so far as the Tractatus is 
designed to help us achieve greater clarity in these matters, it is designed ethically to 
improve us. In the 1918 letter to Engelmann cited earlier, Wittgenstein uses a most 
striking metaphor: that of the “machine for becoming decent.” He writes: 
 
If you tell me I have no faith, you are perfectly right, only I did not have it before 
either. It is plain, isn’t it, that when a man wants, as it were, to invent a machine 
for becoming decent, such a man has no faith.68 
                                                
67 There are important areas of overlap between my approach to Tractarian ethics and that 
defended by Michael Kremer, even though our positions ultimately differ in their details. 
See notably Kremer “Tractarian Nonsense.” 
68 These letters are cited in Monk, Wittgenstein, 152-153. In the original, Wittgenstein’s 
reply from 16.1.1918 reads: “Wenn Sie nun sagen daß ich keinen Glauben habe, so haben 
Sie ganz recht, nur hatte ich ihn auch früher nicht. Es ist ja klar, daß der Mensch der, so 
zu sagen, eine Maschine erfinden will um anständig zu werden, daß dieser Mensch 
keinen Glauben hat. Aber was soll ich tun? Das eine ist mir klar: Ich bin viel zu schlecht 
um über mich spintisieren zu können, sondern, ich werde entweder ein Schweinehund 
bleiben oder mich bessern, und damit basta! Nur kein transzendentales Geschwätz, wenn 
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I suggest that, for Wittgenstein, the Tractatus represents precisely such a “machine for 
becoming decent”: a machine designed to help us become ethically better by helping us 
gain greater clarity in our disposition to use signs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
alles so klar ist wie eine Watschen.” [My italics in the last instance.] See Engelmann, 
Wittgenstein, 10. 
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